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Equalization transfers are a common and noteworthy feature of fiscal 
decentralization systems around the world, especially in developing countries. 
However, the way in which they are designed and implemented is not clearly rooted 
in mainstream public finance theory. In this paper we develop a formal framework 
to explain the rationale of the fiscal gap model (the difference between expenditure 
needs and fiscal capacity of a jurisdiction), arguably the most popular model used 
by applied economists for the design of equalization transfer programs. First we 
take into account the problem of accountability. If government authorities are self-
interested, transfers from upper levels are shown to reduce their responsiveness to 
taxpayers’ preferences. Next, we use a normative approach to derive the 
conventional fiscal gap formula. We argue that equalization transfers should only 
be used to finance limited types and amounts of public expenditures, called here 
standard public expenditures. In contrast, discretional public expenditures (not 
subject to equalization) should be financed exclusively with own revenues. Last, 
we describe the conditions that ensure the affordability of the system. We conclude 
that the fiscal gap model of equalization is sufficient to efficiently allocate the 
available funds across jurisdictions, setting the marginal cost of funds at the 
appropriate level. However, no information on the marginal cost of funds is 
required. Policymakers can simply rely on estimates of expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacity to design an optimal equalization transfer program. 
Keywords: fiscal federalism, equalization transfers, optimal taxation, 
marginal cost of funds, public expenditures 
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The design of an optimal equalization transfer program has been the focus of an extensive 
research in the literature of fiscal federalism. The model of fiscal gaps, which allocates 
equalization transfers in accordance to the differences between expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacities, is arguably the dominant model used by applied economists in fiscal decentralization 
reforms around the world. This model has been championed by international organizations like the 
World Bank, the United Nations, and bilateral donors in many developing countries over the past 
several decades (Boadway and Shah 2007; Martinez-Vazquez and Searle 2007). However, in spite 
of its widespread use, the design of equalization transfers based on the fiscal gap model has not 
been directly rooted in mainstream public finance theory, and applied economists routinely 
struggle to establish its theoretical underpinnings. 
  The objective of this paper is to provide a theoretical rationale for the fiscal gap model. 
Even though the literature has long recognized the importance of effective tax and expenditure 
autonomy to foster efficiency and ensure the presence of accountability mechanisms (Bird and 
Smart 2002; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2006), and equalization transfers have already been 
analyzed in the framework of optimal tax theory (Dahlby and Wilson 1994; Boadway and Keen 
1996; Bucovetsky and Smart 2006; Dahlby 2009), to date it is not clear if and how the fiscal gap 
model can be used to implement an optimal equalization transfer program.1 We show that the 
fiscal gap model is compatible with the notion of an optimal equalization transfer program and 
explain what applied economists and policymakers should consider in order to implement such 
program. 
                                                 
1 For a wide discussion of equalization transfers and the fiscal gap model, see Martinez-Vazquez and Searle (2007). 
Note that we use the term “subnational” to refer to any government unit below the central or “national” level. The 




 The framework presented in this paper is divided in three stages, intended to integrate the 
main normative goals and practical constraints faced by policymakers in the design and 
implementation of an equalization grant based on the fiscal gap model. The first stage deals with 
the role of equalization transfers in the broader context of the revenue assignment problem and the 
need to limit their amount due to possible negative effects on accountability and government 
responsiveness. Fiscal decentralization experts have long claimed that taxpayers hold authorities 
accountable only (or mostly) when public expenditures are financed with own tax revenue; 
consequently, transfers are expected to reduce accountability, government responsiveness, and tax 
effort (Faguet 2004; Blöchliger and Charbit 2008; Liu and Zhao 2011). We provide theoretical 
support for this claim, and argue that the devolution of substantial own revenue sources is a 
precondition for a well-functioning equalization transfer program. An incentive-compatible 
equalization transfer program must penalize inefficient decisions without hindering subnational 
fiscal autonomy.  
  The second stage focuses on the design of an optimal equalization transfer program. As it is 
explicitly or implicitly done in most federal and decentralized countries, we assume that the goal 
of the equalization transfer program is to ensure that all subnational governments are able to 
provide a standard level of public goods and services at a standard level of tax effort. We argue 
that the optimal transfer system should be computed under the assumption of perfect government 
responsiveness, and with the use of a standard tax rate and a standard administrative cost function. 
In this framework, irresponsive and inefficient governments are penalized with lower equalization 
transfers. We distinguish standard public expenditures, which should be subject to equalization, 
from discretional public expenditures, which should not be subject to equalization. Once 




margin,”2 interpreted here as the discretional use of tax policy to finance autonomous or 
discretional (non-standard) public expenditures. Finally, in the third stage we obtain the optimal 
conditions that ensure the affordability of the equalization transfer program.  
  A relevant concern is the practical relevance of some policy prescriptions for equalization 
transfer design derived from the framework of optimal tax theory. In particular, it is not realistic to 
expect that central government authorities and politicians will be able to equalize the marginal cost 
of public funds across jurisdictions. In practice, this is an abstract concept that is normally absent 
from policy debates. In this paper, we show that in fact policy makers do not need to observe the 
marginal cost of funds to implement the optimal revenue assignment policy. Instead, the fiscal gap 
model is sufficient to design an equalization transfer program that tacitly sets the marginal cost of 
funds at the appropriate level. In practice, policy makers can focus only on defining what 
subnational services are to be considered as part of the national standards and the size of the 
equalization transfer fund.  
 The remains of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes the first stage of the 
model, focused on the problem of limited government responsiveness in a context where 
authorities are self-interested and accountability is imperfect. Section 3 presents the second stage 
of the model, focused on the normative problem of designing the optimal amount of equalization 
transfers, and showing how the fiscal gap model is sufficient to implement this program. Section 4 
presents the optimal conditions for the system that implements the equalization transfer program to 
be affordable. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
2 This rule was first put forward by McLure (2000), and its rationale is closely related to Oates’ (1972) 
Decentralization Theorem, according to which, whenever centralized expenditure policies are common across 
jurisdictions and preferences are heterogeneous, social welfare can be increased by decentralized autonomous 
decision-making. Effective autonomy in the expenditure side of the budget, however, requires autonomy to change the 
amount of revenues; thus, the ability to efficiently satisfy local preferences calls for both expenditure and revenue 





2. Accountability and the effect of transfers on government responsiveness  
All intergovernmental transfers have the potential of introducing perverse incentives in the 
decentralization system by reducing accountability and public responsiveness, and even tax effort. 
In this section, we examine what conditions should an equalization transfer program satisfy so to 
avoid those undesirable effects.   
Accountability can be understood as the ability of individuals to use political support (or 
lack thereof) to improve the fiscal decisions of government authorities, who may be concerned not 
only about social welfare but also (or instead) about their own selfish benefits. In this context, 
more accountability leads to a more responsive government, and thus to a better match of fiscal 
decisions with individuals’ needs and wants. Accountability has been mostly addressed in the 
political economy literature, which has focused on the different factors that may affect 
accountability and the degree of preference matching in centralized versus decentralized systems 
of government (Lockwood 2005; Bardhan 2002; Besley and Coate 2003). This literature suggests 
that accountability increases with revenues that are collected inside the jurisdiction, or 
equivalently, it decreases with windfalls and transfers from outside the jurisdiction.  
However, this claim has only recently begun to be empirically tested. Brollo et al. (2013) 
develop a political agency model and show that an increase in transfers, as opposed to own 
revenues, is associated with greater corruption. Using village-level data from an Indonesian 
district, Paler (2013) shows that own taxation provides stronger incentives than windfall transfers 
to monitor the budget and constrain the government. Similarly, Gadenne (2017) finds that 
increases in local taxes in Brazilian municipalities have positive effects on the quality of local 




  Even though this previous literature is suggestive of the type of problems that can arise 
with accountability in the design of a system of intergovernmental transfers, so far there has been a 
lack of formalization of what are the institutional requirements for the design of an optimal 
equalization transfer. In this section, we present a simple reduced-form model of accountability 
from which we derive three conditions for that optimal design: own-revenue, incentive-
compatibility, and expenditure autonomy. The model is based on the concept of net fiscal benefits, 
which is defined for each taxpayer as the difference between the benefits received from 
government expenditures and the costs of financing those expenditures with taxes. Fiscal policies 
that increase taxpayers’ welfare are rewarded with greater political support, and government 
authorities maximize a function that depends on political benefits as well as the gains from 
diverting public funds for their personal use. The model shows that intergovernmental transfers 
reduce local government responsiveness and reveals the conditions that need to be met in order to 
counter low responsiveness. 
  The preferences of the representative taxpayer are represented by a concave utility function 
𝑢 that increases with the consumption of the private good 𝑥 and the local public good available in 
the jurisdiction, 𝐺, which may plausibly be fully congestible. We do not model taxpayer’s behavior 
fully. Instead, throughout the paper we will assume for simplicity that there is only one tax 
instrument and that an increase in the tax rate 𝑡 triggers behavioral responses (in labor supply, tax 
evasion and tax avoidance) of the representative taxpayer, reducing the size of the tax base 𝐵 =
𝐵(𝑡), such that 𝐵𝑡 < 0 , where the subscript represents a derivative. 
  Subnational governments can finance public goods with own tax revenue or with 
exogenous intergovernmental transfers from the central government, 𝑇. Own revenue collection is 




administration, collection and enforcement.3 This cost function is assumed to be differentiable and 
increasing in the amount of revenues collected, 𝑡𝐵(𝑡).4 Net own revenues are given by 𝑅(𝑡) =
𝑡𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐴[𝑡𝐵(𝑡)]. 
  In order to model the accountability mechanism we introduce the choice variable 𝜌 ∈ [0,1], 
defined as subnational government responsiveness to the representative taxpayer’s preferences, or 
the extent to which government decisions about public goods provision truthfully represent the 
preferences of the constituents. If 𝜌 = 1, government expenditures perfectly represent the 
preferences of the constituents. A value lower than unity implies that a share 1 − 𝜌 of subnational 
government funds is “wasted”, due to the inaccurate representation of preferences, neglect, 
production inefficiencies, corruption, or fraud. The amount of public goods and services 
effectively provided by the subnational government is 𝐺(𝑡, 𝜌, 𝑇) = 𝜌(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇), while the amount 
of resources diverted from which authorities can obtain personal benefits is (1 − 𝜌)(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇).  
  Fiscal policies of the subnational government provide net fiscal benefits to the 
representative taxpayer, who in turn is assumed to provide political support to government 
authorities in accordance to the net fiscal benefits received. Private consumption is 𝑋(𝑡) =
(1 − 𝑡)𝐵(𝑡) and the utility of the representative taxpayer is described by 𝑢(𝑋(𝑡), 𝜌(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇)) =
𝑣(𝑡, 𝜌, 𝑇), where 𝑣 is the indirect utility function. The individual marginal net benefits of an 
increase of 𝑡 – which is also the marginal net fiscal incidence of the tax – is given by: 
𝑣𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡𝑢𝑋 + 𝜌𝑅𝑡𝑢𝐺 . (1.a) 
                                                 
3 The costs associated with the use of taxation could possibly include the political costs faced by government 
authorities, as considered by Hettich and Winer (1984). In our analysis, however, political costs and benefits will be 
defined separately in an explicit way. 
4 We acknowledge that revenue collection technologies might be more complex. For instance, Slemrod and Yitzhaki 
(2002) argue that tax administration cost functions may be discontinuous because slight changes in administrative 




𝑣𝑡 can be greater, lower, or equal to zero, meaning that the individual taxpayer can gain, lose, or be 
indifferent about an increase of 𝑡. Provided that 𝑋𝑡 < 0, when public goods are relatively scarce 
we can expect 𝑢𝐺  to be high with respect to 𝑢𝑋, and thus 𝑣𝑡 to be positive. Assuming diminishing 
marginal utility, as 𝑡 increases, and public goods become more abundant, 𝑣𝑡 decreases and 
eventually becomes negative. In contrast, a marginal increase of government responsiveness 𝜌 will 
always increase net fiscal benefits, of course, bounded by its maximum value: 
𝑣𝜌 = (𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇)𝑢𝐺 > 0 (1.b) 
  In this model political gains of government authorities are expected to move in the same 
direction as taxpayers’ net fiscal benefits. For simplicity, we first assume that they have the same 
value. Subnational authorities can gain political support by adjusting 𝑡 toward the level at which 
𝑣𝑡 = 0 (where net fiscal benefits are maximized) or by increasing 𝜌. Note that subnational 
authorities may altruistically value voters’ welfare and support, or may instead be selfishly 
concerned about avoiding removal from office or increasing the probability of reelection, as the 
means to maximize individual rents. Either motive has the same effect of protecting the interests of 
voters. In practice, however, accountability can only be an issue when subnational authorities are 
negligent or pursue their own agenda, which implies that subnational authorities cannot longer be 
assumed to be purely benevolent and efficient.  
  Subnational authorities are assumed to choose 𝑡 and 𝜌 in order to maximize a concave 
benefit function that comprises the political gains they obtain from the overall level of net fiscal 
benefits, measured initially by the utility of the representative taxpayer, and the share of public 
funds diverted for uses different from the efficient provision of public goods:5 
                                                 
5 Once we incorporate the proportion of waste of public funds 𝜌, we may also consider that a share of “active waste” 𝛿 
will report direct benefits to the corrupted government officials (see Bandiera et al 2009 for the distinction between 
active and passive waste and a theoretical and empirical analysis). In that case, the decision maker may use the term 




Ω = 𝑣(𝑡, 𝜌, 𝑇) + (1 − 𝜌)(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇). 
The first order conditions are: 
𝑡: 𝑣𝑡 = −(1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡, (2.a) 
𝜌: 𝑣𝜌 = 𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇. (2.b) 
Note that as long as 𝑅𝑡 > 0 , which is what we expect from a benefit-maximizer government, 𝑢𝑡 
must be negative at the optimal 𝑡. Given diminishing marginal utility of private and public goods, 
this means that the subnational government will generally choose a tax rate that is higher than the 
level necessary to maximize taxpayers’ welfare and political gains. 
 We are particularly interested in the effect of exogenous transfers 𝑇 on optimal government 
responsiveness. A negative (positive) effect of 𝑇 on 𝜌 implies that transfers worsen (improve) 
accountability and responsiveness. First, we consider the case in which the representative taxpayer 
fully accounts for all the effects of 𝑇 on her net fiscal benefits. Using comparative statics, the 






2  . 
Quasi-concavity requires the denominator (the determinant of the Hessian) to be positive, thus the 
sign of the expression will be the same as the sign of the numerator. Since it is not clear what the 
sign of 𝑣𝜌𝑡 and 𝑣𝑡𝑇 are, the effect of 𝑇 on 𝜌 is ambiguous. At this point we can conclude that when 
political support is assumed to be equal to net fiscal benefits, it is not possible to predict a negative 
effect of transfers on government responsiveness. 
                                                 
their own gains. This term would be relevant for describing a more general solution to the problem at hand, but would 
not significantly change the implications of our model of accountability. Thus, for simplicity we will assume 𝛿 = 0 
and restrict the scope of the model to a wide range of inefficiencies, which may or may not involve corruption. 




  The argument put forward by applied economists, however, is that accountability is 
imperfect and taxpayers care (or care much more) about the performance of government 
authorities only when public expenditures are financed with their own money. More than an 
assumption, imperfect accountability is also a logical requirement of the model, because local 
authorities can take advantage of public office only if they are not subject to perfect oversight and 
political control from their constituents. In order to incorporate this argument, we assume that 𝑇 
cannot be fully observed by the taxpayers.7 Consistent with those assumptions, we represent 
political support with the function 𝜋 = 𝜋(𝑡, 𝜌), which is assumed to accumulate the marginal net 
fiscal benefits of 𝑡 and government responsiveness 𝜌, but it does not directly vary with 𝑇. 
Therefore, by definition 𝜋𝑇 = 0, and changes in 𝑇 can affect political support only through their 
influence on 𝑡 and 𝜌. The objective function for the subnational authorities and the first order 
conditions are rewritten as 
Ω′ = 𝜋(𝑡, 𝜌) + (1 − 𝜌)(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇), 
𝑡: 𝜋𝑡 = −(1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡, (3.a) 
𝜌: 𝜋𝜌 = 𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇. (3.b) 






2 . (4) 
Under diminishing marginal utility and assuming 𝑅𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0, the numerator of the right hand side is 
negative, which implies that intergovernmental transfers reduce government responsiveness.9 The 
                                                 
7 An alternative way to justify this assumption follows from observing that even if information about the amount of 
transfers is made fully available to the taxpayers, that information is meaningless if they do not know the costs of 
providing public goods and services.  
8 Derivation is shown in Appendix II. 
9 The assumption 𝑅𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0 is standard in the literature, and can be considered a second order requirement for the 




reason is that transfers give the authorities more “room to cheat,” so that they can reduce 
responsiveness without reducing (or even increasing) their political gains. This result is consistent 
with the predictions and empirical findings of Brollo et al (2013) and Gadenne (2017), who find 
that transfers worsen accountability. The conclusion is that responsiveness improves with own tax 
revenue, and that accountability is maximized when 𝑇 = 0. 
An advantage of the reduced-form model just described is that it can be easily linked to the 
standard maximization model used in the analysis of second-best government decisions. Using the 
assumption that 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑣𝑡 and 𝜋𝜌 = 𝑣𝜌 at the optimal solution, we can rely on (2.b) and (2.c) to 







which is the adjusted Samuelson condition for the optimal amount of public expenditures under a 
second-best scenario where lump-sum taxation is unavailable. The right hand side corresponds to 
the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), a measure of the welfare costs paid by society for a 
marginal increase in government revenues.11 This result shows that the traditional adjusted 
Samuelson condition, normally derived under the assumption of benevolent government, is also 
meaningful in more realistic scenarios where the government is not benevolent.  
  However, it is important to note that condition (5) does not describe the welfare 
maximizing solution when 𝜌 < 1. The right hand side of the condition underestimates the MCF of 
the representative taxpayer because it considers as gains the rents received by subnational 
                                                 
increases with the tax rate. Other things equal, public goods and services become cheaper with higher tax rates and 
there would be no reason to choose a tax rate lower than 100%. 
10 Provided 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑣𝑡  and 𝜋𝜌 = 𝑣𝜌, we can use (2.a), (2.b), (3.a) and (3.b) to show that at the optimal response in (4), 
𝑣𝜌 = −(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇)𝑣𝑡/(1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡. Making the right hand side of this equation equal to the right hand side of (1.b), and 
rearranging, 𝑣𝑡 = −(1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑢𝐺. Substituting into (1.a) we can obtain (5). 
11 Ballard and Fullerton (1992) and Dahlby (2008) provide extensive discussions of the concept of the marginal cost of 





authorities, which are not shared with the rest of society.12 Provided 𝜌 < 1, the tax rate that 







  (6) 
which is the adjusted Samuelson condition after correcting for limited government responsiveness. 
The right hand side is the “true” MCF faced by the representative taxpayer and, as expected, it 
increases with the reduction of 𝜌.13  
  Figure 1 describes the effect of intergovernmental transfers on the optimal amount of 
public goods. The horizontal axis represents public expenditures and the vertical axes the marginal 
costs and benefits of public funds. The demand for government expenditures is given by the 
representative taxpayer’s marginal rate of substitution between public and private goods, which is 
assumed to be decreasing. The supply of public expenditures corresponds to the MCF, which is a 
function of 𝑡, 𝜌, and 𝑇. In particular, the MCF function is assumed to be increasing in 𝑡. The initial 
equilibrium 𝑒1 corresponds to a situation without transfers, where government responsiveness 𝜌 is 
at its maximum value, assumed here to be 1, and the optimal MCF faced by the jurisdiction is 
𝑀𝐶𝐹1. The effect of an exogenous amount of intergovernmental transfers 𝑇 is to shift the MCF 
function from 𝑀𝐶𝐹′ to 𝑀𝐶𝐹′′ and to move the equilibrium to 𝑒2.14 Transfers allow the government 
                                                 
12 To see this, knowing that 𝜋𝜌 = 𝑣𝜌 we can use (1.b) and (2.b) to show that 𝑢𝐺 = 1. Replacing this value into (1.a) 
and equating the right hand sides of (1.a) and (2.a) we obtain (𝑋𝑡𝑢𝑋 + 𝜌
∗𝑅𝑡) + (𝑅𝑡 − 𝜌
∗𝑅𝑡) = 0. It is easy to see that 
an increase in 𝜌∗ leads to additional political gains (the term 𝜌∗𝑅𝑡 in the first parenthesis) which are exactly offset by 
the reduction in individual rents (the term −𝜌∗𝑅𝑡 in the second parenthesis). 
13 The MCF faced by a local community considers only the welfare costs borne inside the jurisdiction. The welfare 
costs borne by taxpayers outside the jurisdiction, due for instance to the negative effect that 𝑡 may have on the central 
government tax collections, are normally disregarded by subnational authorities. We come back to this issue in section 
4, where we analyze the problem of revenue decentralization in the presence of tax externalities. 
14 More commonly, intergovernmental transfers are associated with positive, although relatively low or subsidized, 
marginal costs to subnational governments. This is because a share of the transfers received may have been financed 
with taxes collected inside the jurisdiction, and so they may either erode subnational tax bases or require some degree 





to substitute away own tax collections (reduced from 𝐺1 to 𝑅2), while increasing public goods 
provision and reducing the optimal MCF from 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 to 𝑀𝐶𝐹2.15  
  The equilibrium 𝑒2 describes the optimal choice of self-interested government authorities, 
but not the amount of public goods available to the representative taxpayer. In accordance to (4) 
and (6), transfers reduce government responsiveness and thus shift the representative taxpayer’s 
MCF function to 𝑀𝐶𝐹′′′. The amount of public goods actually available to the representative 
taxpayer is 𝐺2, found by evaluating 𝑀𝐶𝐹′′′ at the marginal cost 𝑀𝐶𝐹2. The welfare maximizing 
solution described in (6) is found at 𝑒3, but that point is no longer feasible.  
Figure 1  
Effect of transfers on optimal government expenditures  
 
 Thus, if provided in the right amount, intergovernmental transfers allow subnational 
governments to reach more efficient and/or fairer levels of expenditures, but at the cost of 
worsening government responsiveness. The thought experiment presented in Figure 1 can now be 
used to highlight three “conditions” for the design of an optimal equalization transfer system. None 
of these conditions have been adequately addressed in the previous theoretical literature. 
                                                 
15 A similar result is found in Smart (1998), although based in a different reasoning. He argues that equalization 
transfers reduce the MCF because they help to avoid part of the distortionary effects of local tax increases. See Dahlby 






















 First, we have what we will call the own-revenue condition. Since transfers worsen 
government responsiveness, they increase the MCF faced by the representative taxpayer at any 
given level of public goods provision – as illustrated by the shift from 𝑀𝐶𝐹′′ to 𝑀𝐶𝐹′′′ in Figure 
1. Moreover, even though intergovernmental transfers can usually be expected to reduce the MCF 
and stimulate public goods provision – as illustrated in the change from 𝑒1 to 𝑒3– the opposite 
result is also possible if they induce a significant loss of government responsiveness. The negative 
effects of intergovernmental transfers on government responsiveness and the effective MCF call 
for a measured use of transfers and the promotion of own sources of revenue for the financing of 
local governments.  
  Second, we have the incentive-compatibility condition. In the presence of limited 
government responsiveness, the representative taxpayer’s welfare maximizing amount of public 
goods 𝐺3 is neither feasible nor desirable. In the model developed in this section, self-interested 
government authorities will choose to collect an amount of 𝑅2 in tax revenue, and to provide 
public goods by 𝐺2. It is not immediately clear what amount of public goods provision should an 
equalization transfer system try to reach. For instance, reaching an amount equal to 𝑅2 + 𝑇 > 𝐺3, 
would require additional transfers and therefore lead to a larger lack of responsiveness.  
  Third, we have the expenditure autonomy condition. The question about the desired amount 
of public goods and services cannot be clarified without creating a new problem related with the 
level of autonomy that subnational authorities should enjoy in a decentralized system of 
government. If some of the gains from fiscal decentralization are realized because local authorities 
are better positioned to tailor fiscal decisions to taxpayers’ preferences (Oates 1972), then the final 
equilibrium should be determined by local policies, not by exogenous transfers. In this sense, an 




to enhance decision making autonomy in expenditure choices. As McLure (2000, p. 626) puts it, 
subnational expenditure autonomy requires that subnational governments are “able to control the 
level of revenue at the margin; that is, they must be able to set the level of taxes to correspond to 
the desires of voters”.16 Following this argument the optimal MCF faced by the representative 
taxpayer should be allowed to vary in each jurisdiction in accordance to the local demand for 
public goods and services, while the amount of transfers should not be affected by the autonomous 
decisions made in different jurisdictions.  
3. Designing the welfare maximizing equalization transfer  
We now turn to the problem of designing an equalization transfer program that maximizes 
social welfare, in a context where subnational autonomy is desirable but subject to self-interested 
(inefficient) decisions by local authorities. The design of the optimal level of equalization will 
need to satisfy the three conditions identified in the previous section. In this section we focus on 
the optimal amount of equalization transfers; the affordability of the transfer’s system is analyzed 
in the next section. 
  The equalization transfer system is normally designed by an institutional body at a level 
higher than subnational governments, which is here assumed to be the central government. 
Formally, in order to arrive at the welfare maximizing transfer program we need to assume that the 
central government is benevolent. This assumption is made exclusively with the purpose of finding 
a sound policy design for the equalization transfer program; it is by no means to argue that the 
central government is in fact benevolent or that it may not be subject to similar incentives as 
subnational authorities.  
                                                 




  In countries where subnational governments are responsible for providing local public 
goods and services, the central government usually determines common standards for subnational 
public expenditures and revenue effort, and delivers the amounts of transfers that allow all 
subnational governments to meet those standards. This strategy results in the system of 
equalization transfers, in which the ability to finance comparable or standard baskets of certain 
public goods and services is equalized across all governments of the same level. 
 The model developed in this section considers a central government and 𝐽 subnational 
jurisdictions of the same level. Each jurisdiction 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 is assumed to have one representative 
taxpayer. The central government applies a tax rate 𝑡𝑐 identically to all jurisdictions, and each 
subnational government retains autonomy to define its own tax rate 𝑡𝑗  inside its borders. 17 For 
simplicity, we do not consider the potential mobility of the population or factors of production, nor 
any horizontal externality imposed by local tax and expenditure decisions.18  
  As pointed out above, in order to find the optimal level of equalization transfers the central 
government needs to satisfy the three conditions identified in the previous section. The own-
revenue condition deals with the more general problem of revenue assignments. Subnational 
governments must be given access to revenue sources from which they can effectively collect a 
significant amount of own revenue, as well as the discretional power to adjust the tax rates, if not 
the tax bases (Martinez-Vazquez, 2015; McLure, 2000).  
                                                 
17 The local tax base 𝐵𝑗  may or may not be shared between the subnational and the central government. Either the 
subnational tax rate or the central tax rate could be set equal to zero to represent a tax instrument that has been 
assigned exclusively to the central or subnational government, respectively. 
18 Mobility may affect the optimal central government decisions through its effects on tax bases, but it is treated as an 
exogenous variable that does not alter the prevailing normative goals of welfare maximization and (partial or full) 
equalization. Horizontal fiscal externalities may also be relevant, but their effects on optimal revenue structure at the 




  The incentive-compatibility condition suggests that the design of the equalization transfer 
system should help encourage responsive and efficient government behavior, while providing 
taxpayers with incentives to hold local authorities accountable. In order to encourage government 
responsiveness, we argue that equalization transfers should be determined under the normative 
assumption of full responsiveness, or 𝜌 = 1. This assumption implies that a jurisdiction cannot be 
compensated for the irresponsive behavior of its authorities. This means that the representative 
taxpayer in each jurisdiction bears the full cost of electing self-interested government authorities.19 
If this were not the case, the rewards of lower responsiveness would lead to inefficient expenditure 
policies and to a soft budget constraint problem.20 By assuming 𝜌 = 1, therefore, we make sure 
that the equalization transfer system helps the accountability mechanisms to work locally. In order 
to encourage government efficiency, and as is common in both the theoretical and applied 
literatures, we define a standard level of tax effort. Standard tax effort is jointly defined by a 
standard tax rate 𝑡𝑠 and a standard administrative cost function 𝐴𝑠, both common to all 
jurisdictions. For the same 𝑡𝑠, administrative costs above the standard lead only to lower net 
revenue, not to more transfers. Similarly, when administrative costs are below the standard, net 
revenue may increase without affecting the amount of transfers to be received. 
 To address the expenditure autonomy condition we divide subnational public expenditures 
𝐺𝑗 into two different categories. One consists of standard public expenditures per capita 𝐺𝑠, which 
are meant to be fully financed by a mix of equalization transfers 𝑇𝑗 and by own revenues collected 
                                                 
19 Reduced responsiveness affects the actual tax rates and thus may impose tax externalities on other government units. 
We deal with vertical tax externalities in Section 4. 
20 The literature on the soft budget constraint focuses on the problems created by the use of transfers to assist 
governments under financial stress, which suggests that intergovernmental transfers can actually be influenced by the 
behavior of subnational governments (see Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack 2003). Accordingly, a number of empirical 
studies treat intergovernmental transfers as an endogenous variable (Knight 2002; Gordon 2004; Dahlberg et al 2008).  





under a standard level of tax effort. Standard public expenditures 𝐺𝑠 can be interpreted as the cost 
of providing a common (or perhaps a minimum) bundle of public goods and services to the 
representative taxpayer of each jurisdiction. The specific public goods and services included in the 
subnational standard are assumed exogenous, and may be considered as “necessary” for the 
representative taxpayers.  
  The other category consists of non-standard, autonomous, and discretional public 
expenditures 𝐺𝑑𝑗. Under this category, we might include the same public goods and services 
considered in the standard package, but only to the extent that they deviate from that standard level 
of provision, or other public goods that the subnational government discretionally chooses to 
provide and that are not part of the national standard package. Positive amounts of discretional 
public expenditures should be financed entirely with own revenue collections.21 The distinction 
between standard and discretional expenditures is important to model central government 
intervention in a system where subnational governments are granted some degree of fiscal 
autonomy. In such a system subnational governments are allowed to offer different amounts and 
types of public goods and services, and the central government cannot, and should not, account for 
those differences when distributing equalization transfers.  
  Formally, with the objective of maximizing the sum of utilities of the representative 
taxpayers, the problem of designing the optimal equalization transfer system can be based on the 
following Lagrangian expression: 
                                                 
21 Note that to the extent that subnational governments enjoy budget decision autonomy, in certain cases they could 









+ 𝜇𝑐{−𝐺𝑐 − ∑ 𝑇𝑗𝐽𝑗=1 + 𝑡
𝑐𝐵 − 𝐴𝑐[𝑡𝑐𝐵]} (7) 
where 𝐵 = ∑ 𝐵𝑗𝐽𝑗=1 , both 𝑋
𝑗 and 𝐵𝑗 are functions of 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑒 + 𝑡𝑗 + 𝑡𝑐, and 𝜇𝑠𝑗 and 𝜇𝑐 are the 
Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraints of standard subnational expenditures 
and the central government. The first order condition for the optimal amount of equalization 
transfers 𝑇𝑗∗ is given by 
𝑇𝑗:  𝜇𝑠𝑗 − 𝜇𝑐 = 0 ,   𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽. (8.a) 
The optimal vector of intergovernmental transfers must make the marginal cost of standard own 
revenue collections in any jurisdiction 𝑗 equal to the marginal cost of own revenues at the central 
level. In other words, at the optimal solution, the marginal cost of financing standard public 
expenditures should be identical for all government units across the country. Using (8.a), the first 
order conditions for the optimal national standard of subnational public goods 𝐺𝑠∗ and the optimal 























= 𝜇𝑐 (8.c) 




. Following Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995), we can combine (8.b) and 
(8.c) to express the social marginal cost of funds of standard revenue collections, 𝑆𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑠, as the 
product of an efficiency and an equity component. Equating the left hand sides of (8.b) and (8.c), 
dividing by the average marginal utility of income ?̅?𝑋 = ∑ 𝑢𝑋𝑗
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1 /𝐽, multiplying by 
∑ 𝑋𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1 / ∑ 𝑋𝑡
𝑗𝐽































The first expression in the right hand side is the marginal efficiency cost of funds, 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑠, which 
increases with the negative externality of 𝑡𝑠 on central government revenue collections, 𝑡𝑐𝐵𝑡 −
𝐴𝑡𝑠
𝑐 . The second expression is Feldstein’s (1972) “distributional characteristic” of standard own 




 are the same in all jurisdictions, then 𝐷𝐶𝑠 = 1 and 
𝑡𝑠 has no distributional effects. In contrast, if the tax rate has a smaller effect on consumption in 
jurisdictions with greater marginal utility of income (likely those that are poorer), then 𝐷𝐶𝑠 < 1, 
which means that inequalities are reduced. This implies that the social costs of tax collections are 
partially offset by the social benefits of redistribution. We can conclude that the greater the 
redistributive effects of the equalization transfer system, the greater the standard tax rate 𝑡𝑠∗ that 
should be required from subnational governments.  
  Moreover, if for a moment we make the unrealistic assumptions that subnational authorities 
are fully responsive welfare maximizers, that their expenditure decisions consider only standard 
(not discretional) public expenditures, and that they address the tax externalities they impose on 
the central government, then their problem can be represented by (7), and the first order conditions 













𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑠𝑗 ,   𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽. (10) 
Using the definition of 𝑆𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑠 in (9) as well as the equalization condition in (8.a), it must be true 




𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑠𝑗 ,   𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽. (11) 
An analogous result in the related literature has shown that the distributionally-weighted 




the two subnational governments is inversely related to the ratio of their distributional weights 
(Dahlby and Wilson 1994).22 Different from these results, however, condition (11) applies only to 
the provision of standard public expenditures, and it is explicitly based on several ideal 
assumptions that cannot realistically describe actual government behavior. 
Still, condition (11) is useful because it provides a normative framework where we can 
define the basic constructs of the fiscal gap approach to designing equalization grants. In the 
remains of this section we introduce formal definitions of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, 
and use them to characterize the fiscal gap as a sufficient approach to the optimal assignment of 
equalization transfers. 
3.1 Expenditure needs and fiscal capacity  
The concepts of fiscal capacity and expenditure needs are the two fundamental building 
blocks of most equalization transfer programs designed around the world. These programs are 
based on the fiscal gap formula, computed as the difference between estimate of expenditure needs 
and estimate of fiscal capacity.  
What is the theoretical rationale for expenditure needs and fiscal capacity?  To answer this 
question, we proceed to define the concepts of expenditure needs, fiscal capacity, and vertical and 
horizontal fiscal imbalances. We use Figure 2 to illustrate the definitions for these concepts for any 
given jurisdiction, so the symbol 𝑗 can be omitted to simplify notation. But first, some setting up. 
The horizontal axis represents only those goods and services subject to equalization. With no 
transfers, the equilibrium is 𝑒1, on the intersection between the marginal benefit function and 
marginal cost function 𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑠′, which is defined in accordance to (10). Using asterisks to represent 
                                                 
22 In a utilitarian welfare function with representative taxpayers, different jurisdictions have the same social weight. In 











the optimal solution, the optimal amount of transfers 𝑇∗ shifts the function 𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑠′ to 𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑠′′, 
moving the equilibrium to 𝑒∗. As a result, the MCF decreases to 𝜇𝑠∗ 𝑢𝑋⁄  and the amount of 
standard public expenditures increases to 𝑅𝑠∗ + 𝑇∗. 
Now, fiscal capacity or own revenue potential, 𝐹𝐶, is defined as the amount of own revenues 
that a (fully responsive) subnational government would be able to collect at the optimal MCF under 
the optimal standard level of tax effort. Formally, the fiscal capacity of any jurisdiction is  
𝐹𝐶 = 𝑅𝑠∗. (12) 
This definition is largely compatible with the traditional measurement of fiscal capacity, according 
to which fiscal capacity corresponds to the ability to raise own revenues from the assigned tax 
bases given a standard level of tax effort.23 In practice, however, it is not clear how full 
responsiveness translates into budgetary decisions, and it is not possible to estimate fiscal capacity 
under the full responsiveness assumption.24 Because of this reason, applied economists rely on the 
more pragmatic assumption – implicit in fiscal capacity methodologies – of “average” tax effort 
and responsiveness.  
  Similarly, expenditure needs, 𝐸𝑁, is defined as the optimal amount of standard public 
expenditures that the subnational government should provide at the optimal MCF. Formally, the 
expenditure needs of any jurisdiction are defined as: 
𝐸𝑁 = 𝑅𝑠∗ + 𝑇∗. (13) 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007). This definition differs from the one provided in Dahlby 
(2009), in which the tax base is divided by its tax elasticity in order to account for the negative effect of the sensitivity 
of the tax base on fiscal capacity. We do not do that, however, because the sensitivity of the tax base is already 
accounted for by the slope of the MCF function. 
24 Methodologies to estimating fiscal capacity can be found, for instance, in U.S. Advisory Commission on 




This definition is compatible with the traditional notion of expenditure needs, typically related to a 
“comparable” or “standard” package of goods and services, which is made affordable by the 
transfers received and the fiscal capacity of the jurisdiction.25  
    As indicated already above, the fiscal gap of any jurisdiction, denoted by 𝐹𝐺, can be 
defined as  
𝐹𝐺 = 𝐸𝑁 − 𝐹𝐶 .(14) 
A positive fiscal gap means that the amount of revenues raised under a given level of tax effort are 
not enough to cover the expenditure needs of the jurisdiction, and thus additional resources in the 
form of equalization transfers are required in order to provide a standard bundle of public goods 
and services. In contrast, a negative fiscal gap implies that the jurisdiction has a “surplus” and is 
able to provide more or better public services without any financial assistance. 
 
Figure 2 
Fiscal capacity, expenditures needs and optimal equalization transfers 
 
                                                 
25 A discussion about the concept, measurement methodologies, and use of expenditure needs estimates is provided, 





















3.2 Horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances 
Given that expenditure needs and tax bases vary widely across jurisdictions, it is normal to 
observe significant differences in the value of fiscal gaps among governments of the same level. 
These differences are known as horizontal imbalances, and equalization transfers are typically 
aimed to eliminating, or at least reducing, these imbalances. In practice, countries make use of 
three possible equalization strategies. Some distribute equalization transfers in accordance to 
relative expenditure needs only; others attempt to equalize only the differences in fiscal capacity, 
and others consider both factors simultaneously and attempt to equalize fiscal gaps (Boex and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2007; Dafflon, 2007). To the extent that one additional monetary unit of 
expenditure needs has exactly the same impact on the public budget as the reduction of one 
monetary unit of fiscal capacity, both factors are equally important and the equalization of fiscal 
gaps can be regarded as the best approach to equalization. Indeed, the optimal transfer vector under 
condition (11) can be seen as an equalization transfer program that equalizes fiscal gaps across all 
jurisdictions of the same level.  
 The differences observed in the design and depth of the expenditure and revenue 
decentralization assignments lead to different fiscal gaps across levels of government. These 
differences are usually referred to as vertical fiscal imbalances, and any transfer – including 
general tax sharing – from the government level with a negative fiscal gap (usually the central 
government) to the government level with positive fiscal gap (usually subnational governments) 




the size of the vertical imbalance 𝑉𝐼 between the central and subnational governments under the 
optimal solution described in (11) is given by:26 
𝑉𝐼 = ∑ 𝐹𝐺𝑗𝐽𝑗=1  .(15) 
Under the same assumptions, we can also define horizontal imbalances as the differences in 
fiscal gaps across governments of the same level. By using our definition of fiscal gap, therefore, 
we can clearly define the concepts of vertical and horizontal imbalances.27  
  If the subnational governments with negative fiscal gaps transfer all their surpluses to the 
subnational governments with positive fiscal gaps, the size of the vertical imbalance would be 
equal to the total amount of transfers required to fully close the horizontal imbalances only.28 More 
commonly, however, governments with negative fiscal gaps do not contribute to the equalization 
transfer fund and thus the amount of resources required to fully eliminate the horizontal 
imbalances is greater than the vertical imbalance. As a consequence, neither the horizontal nor the 
vertical fiscal imbalances will be closed optimally (Boadway and Tremblay, 2006). 
  There are a number of possible limitations to the ability of the system to close fiscal gaps. 
Besides the impossibility of collecting contributions from (richer) jurisdictions with negative fiscal 
gaps, countries use transfers to fulfill objectives different from equalization, like pro-poor 
programs or infrastructure investments. The resources used for these purposes will help to close 
the vertical imbalance, but not necessarily the horizontal imbalances. As the central government is 
                                                 
26 There is no clear agreement in the literature about the right terminology to define these concepts. Boadway and 
Tremblay (2006, 2010), for example, use the term ‘fiscal gap’ to refer to what we call here vertical imbalance, and in 
turn they use the term ‘fiscal imbalance’ to refer to deviations from the optimal equilibrium. 
27 Bird and Tarasov (2004) argue that the two concepts cannot be cleanly separated, and for that purpose, they suggest 
considering the vertical imbalance closed at the point where the fiscal gap of the wealthiest jurisdiction is zero. 
28 Such an arrangement is known as the “fraternal” (or Robin Hood) approach to equalization, and it is relatively 




unable to reduce the marginal cost of funds nationwide to the optimal level, there will be a 
downward adjustment to the standard of expenditure needs that can be guaranteed by the system.  
 In general, note that in order to implement an equalization transfer program that reduces 
horizontal imbalances, it is not necessary to know the marginal cost of funds’ functions faced by 
each subnational government. In practice, it is sufficient to define the national standards for the 
provision of public goods and services and the national standard of tax effort for the collections of 
revenues, and to disburse the equalization transfers in accordance with the estimated fiscal gaps. 
This is the point where the formal theory of revenue assignments meets the practice of equalization 
transfer implementation using a fiscal gap approach. Policy makers do not need to understand the 
theoretical underpinnings of the fiscal gap model; instead, they can rely on estimations of 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of the different subnational governments. 
4. Ensuring affordability and addressing vertical tax externalities  
The concepts of standard public expenditures and standard tax effort are relevant only for 
the purpose of computing the optimal equalization transfer vector, and do not guarantee in any way 
that the transfers arrived at are actually affordable within existing budgets. In this section we focus 
on the problem of ensuring affordability of the equalization transfer system. From the perspective 
of the central government, this problem is simultaneous, but different in nature, from the normative 
problem of what amount of equalization transfers subnational governments should receive. We 
assume that subnational governments know the amounts of equalization transfers that they will 
receive when choosing their optimal tax rates, and do not take into account the possible effects of 
their current fiscal decisions on future equalization transfers. These assumptions seem plausible if 
we consider that the fiscal gap formula uses expenditure needs instead of actual expenditures, and 




governments to affect either component of the formula.29 The central government is assumed to 
take subnational responses into account when deciding about the tax rates that will ensure the 
affordability of the system. 
  Once optimal equalization transfers have been determined, each jurisdiction should enjoy 
some degree of freedom to select the amount of standard and discretional public goods and 
services that best fit local preferences (the expenditure autonomy condition). The greater the 
demand for public goods and services, the greater the need for tax revenue and thus the higher the 
optimal MCF in the jurisdiction. In this context, the actual level of tax effort should be expected to 
vary with the preferences and characteristics of each community, and there is nothing inherently 
wrong with choosing to exert lower or higher tax efforts than the average jurisdiction.  
  Subnational autonomy also implies that the amount of funds available to the central 
government, and thus the optimal choice of the central government tax rate 𝑡𝑐, is subject to the 
actual fiscal decisions of subnational authorities. In order to model the behavior of self-interested 
subnational authorities in the presence of standard and discretional public expenditures, we need to 
adjust the objective function used in Section 2. We use 𝑅𝑠 = 𝑡𝑠𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑠[𝑡𝑠𝐵(𝑡)], define 
discretional own revenue 𝑅𝑑 = 𝑡𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐴[(𝑡𝑠 + 𝑡)𝐵(𝑡)] + 𝐴𝑠[𝑡𝑠𝐵(𝑡)], and drop the superscript 𝑗 
for clarity. In addition, considering that marginal political gains have been assumed to be equal to 
marginal net fiscal benefits, we abuse notation slightly and represent political support with the 
                                                 
29 Still, the theoretical and applied literatures recognize that subnational government may consider in certain cases the 
effect of their fiscal decisions on equalization transfers. For instance, Smart (1998) explains that when transfers are 
based on the observed tax base, an increase in local taxes that erode the tax base (𝐵𝑡 < 0) would lead to a reduction of 
tax revenue collected under standard tax effort and so an increase of equalization transfers. One simple way to 
minimize the manipulation of standard tax revenue by subnational governments is to average the last 3 or 5 year 
estimates of fiscal capacity in order to delay the effect of fiscal decisions on transfers. If transfers are assigned in 
accordance to (14) and fiscal capacity is averaged over 𝑛 years, then a reduction of one dollar of fiscal capacity in the 




utility function 𝑢 = 𝑢(𝑋(𝑡), 𝐺𝑠, 𝐺𝑑 , 𝐺𝑐). The problem faced by the self-interested subnational 
authorities can be represented by the following Lagrangian expression:   
ℒ 𝑗 = 𝑢(𝑋(𝑡), 𝐺𝑠, 𝐺𝑑, 𝐺𝑐) + (1 − 𝜌)(𝑅𝑠 + 𝑅𝑑 + 𝑇∗) 
+𝛿𝑠{−𝐺𝑠 + 𝜌(𝑅𝑠 + 𝑇∗)} + 𝛿𝑑{−𝐺𝑑 + 𝜌𝑅𝑑} , 
where 𝛿𝑠 and 𝛿𝑑 are the Lagrangian multipliers of standard and discretional subnational 
expenditures, respectively. The first order conditions for the optimal choices of the discretional tax 
rate 𝑡 and government responsiveness 𝜌 are  




𝑑) = 0 , (16.a) 
𝜌: −(𝑅𝑠 + 𝑅𝑑 + 𝑇∗) + 𝛿𝑠(𝑅𝑠 + 𝑇∗) + 𝛿𝑑𝑅𝑑 = 0 , (16.b) 
which are analogous to (3.a) and (3.b).30 
  Defining 𝑅𝑐 = 𝑡𝑐𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑐[𝑡𝑐𝐵(𝑡)], the problem of the central government, which needs 
to ensure affordability of public expenditures nationally while allowing for subnational discretion 
is represented by the following Lagrangian expression: 








+𝛿𝑐{−𝐺𝑐 − ∑ 𝑇𝑗∗𝐽𝑗=1 + 𝑅
𝑐} . (17) 
Assuming for simplicity that the utility functions are separable in 𝐺𝑐, such that its value does not 




𝑐 . (18.a) 
                                                 
30 When we make no distinction between standard and discretional expenditures we can define  𝛿 = 𝛿𝑠 = 𝛿𝑑, and 
from (16.b) we obtain 𝛿 = 𝑢𝐺 = 1. Using this result, as well as 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑠 + 𝑅𝑡
𝑑 , condition (16.a) reduces to 𝑋𝑡𝑢𝑋 +









, and using (16.a) and (16.b), the first order condition for the optimal 𝑡𝑐 
can be simplified to 









)}𝐽𝑗=1   (18.b.i) 
+𝛿𝑐(𝑅𝑡𝑐














)𝐽𝑗=1   (18.b.iii) 
+ ∑ 𝜌𝑡𝑐
𝑗∗
(𝑅𝑠𝑗 + 𝑅𝑑𝑗 + 𝑇𝑗∗)𝐽𝑗=1 = 0.  (18.b.iv) 
The central government must increase 𝑡𝑐 up to the point where the marginal costs and marginal 
benefits cancel each other. Among the costs, (18.b.i) represents the reduction in private 
consumption and the provision of subnational public goods and services. Among the benefits, 
(18.b.ii) represents tax collections after accounting for subnational tax responses. Whether 
(18.b.iii) and (18.b.iv) correspond to costs or benefits of the central government tax policy will 




. They would correspond to additional costs if 𝑡𝑐 has a positive 
effect on 𝑡𝑗∗ and a negative effect on 𝜌𝑗∗. 
  By endogenizing the response of subnational tax policy and responsiveness in its optimal 
tax decision, the central government can partially correct for inefficient subnational tax decisions. 
These inefficiencies arise because subnational governments typically ignore the negative 
externalities their decisions impose outside their jurisdictions. In particular, higher subnational tax 
rates can erode the tax bases within the jurisdiction and thus impose a negative vertical externality 




Boadway, Marchand and Vigneault 1998; Keen 1998; Dahlby and Wilson 2003).31 In order to 
identify these externalities in our model, we note that if the choice of the subnational tax rate 𝑡𝑗  
were to account for all the social benefits and costs described in (17), its first order condition 














𝑐 = 0 ,   𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽. 
The term 𝛿𝑐𝑅
𝑡𝑗
𝑐  corresponds to the value of revenue lost by the central government due to a 
marginal increase of the subnational tax rate. A subnational government guided by the adjusted 
Samuelson condition in (5) ignores this cost, but the presence of this term in (18.b.ii) suggests that 
the central government can partially correct for it when deciding about the optimal amount of tax 
collections. This finding contrasts with the idea that the negative tax externalities associated with 
decentralized tax revenues should be fully corrected by the equalization transfer program in order 
to avoid inefficiencies and welfare losses.32 This correction might be justified. However, it should 
be so only on a differential basis because the externalities imposed by discretional tax decisions 
would likely differ across jurisdictions. This differential correction can be understood as an 
adjustment to the marginal cost of funds faced by each jurisdiction, and it would lead to an 
adjustment to the optimal equalization vector implicitly described by (11). 
 
                                                 
31 Revenue externalities (positive or negative) can also be imposed on governments of the same level, but we have 
ruled out this possibility for simplifying purposes. In any case, the effects and implications of horizontal externalities 
are similar to those of vertical externalities. See, for instance, Gordon (1983) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006). 
32 Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) and Kotsogiannis (2010) describe the modifications required by a standard 
equalization transfer formula in order to achieve efficient subnational taxation in the presence of horizontal and 





In this paper, we have shown that the fiscal gap model used by applied economists around 
the world in the design of equalization grants is compatible with a ‘holistic’ approach that 
integrates practical as well as normative considerations. The fiscal gap model is largely compatible 
with some of the findings of the (less holistic) previous theoretical literature on the design of 
equalization transfers based on optimal tax theory, but the latter is shown to disregard some key 
issues that are relevant for the implementation of an optimal equalization transfer program. These 
issues include the need to account for discretional subnational decisions, the negative effects of 
transfers on responsiveness, and the consequent need to introduce accountability mechanisms.   
  The framework presented in this paper is divided in three stages. The first stage deals with 
the problem of limited government responsiveness and the need for accountability mechanisms. In 
this regard we examine two questions: Is the devolution of sufficient own revenue sources a 
precondition for a well-functioning equalization transfer program, and must the equalization 
transfer program must be incentive-compatible by rewarding efficiency and government 
responsiveness? The second stage focuses on the design of an optimal equalization transfer 
program. In line with commonly accepted international practices, we assume that the goal of the 
equalization transfer program is to ensure that all subnational governments are able to provide a 
standard level of public goods and services at a standard level of tax effort, while promoting 
efficient fiscal decisions. In order to obtain the optimal amount of equalization transfers that fulfill 
this goal, we distinguish standard subnational expenditures subject to equalization from 
discretional subnational expenditures that should be financed solely with own revenue sources. 




capacity, fiscal gap and fiscal imbalances. The third stage focuses on the central government 
decision about the level of its tax rate, which ensures the affordability of the system. 
  The most important contribution in this paper is to show that the fiscal gap model is 
sufficient to implement an optimal equalization transfer program and that the implementation of 
this type of program requires only the estimation of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. 
Therefore, central government authorities and politicians do not need to try to find out what is the 
marginal cost of public funds across jurisdictions. 
  For future research, there are several aspects of the framework introduced here that could 
be extended, including the use of single representative-taxpayer jurisdictions, the absence of 
mobility and other horizontal externalities, or the ability to take into account positive fiscal 
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The linearization of the system of first order conditions (2.a) and (2.b) can be written, in matrix form, 
as 
[
𝑢𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡 𝑢𝜌𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡




] =  − [
𝑢𝑡𝑇
𝜌𝑢𝜌𝜌 − 1
] ∗ [𝑑𝑇] (A.I.1) 
where the first matrix is the Hessian 𝐻. Using Cramer’s rule, the effect of transfers 𝑇 on optimal 















2  , (A.I.2) 
which is equal to the result in the text. 
 
Appendix II. Derivation of (4) 
 Since 𝑇 does not directly affect taxpayer’s political support 𝜋(𝑡, 𝜌), the system in (A.I.1) becomes 
[
𝜋𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡 𝜋𝜌𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡




] =  [
0
1
] ∗ [𝑑𝑇] (A.II.1) 















2 , (A.II.2) 
which is equal to (4). 
 
 
